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:

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

The main issue on appeal is whether or not there exists

any material issue of fact with respect to damages which should
have precluded the lower Court from granting Summary Judgment

against Defendant-Appellant Okland Ltd., Inc. (hereinafter
"Okland" or "Appellant") and in favor of Plaintiff-Respondent,
First Security Financial (hereinafter "First Security" or
"Respondent").
2.

A supplemental issue which has arisen due to the

pleadings on appeal is what matters can properly be reviewed
on appeal.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This appeal is taken from the final Summary Judgment
entered by the Honorable Judith M. Billings in the Third
Judicial District Court against Appellant and in favor of
Respondent (Summary Judgment, R. 257-259;A.1-3).
The action in the lower court was brought by the Respondant
against the appellant and one other party and involved the default
and breach of an Equipment Lease Agreement (Lease, R. 3-6;A.4-7).
On October 15, 1985, Summary Judgment against Appellant
was formally entered by the lower court.

Summary Judgment was

previously entered against the other party and is not part of
this appeal.

This appeal involves Appellant and Respondant

exclusively.

Third parties not affected by this Summary Judgment

have stipulated to its finality for purposes of this appeal(R.395397),
The hearing on Respondants'motion for Summary Judgment
was on September 23, 1985. The Court after hearing and considering
the arguments of counsel found as a matter of law, that;

Respondant1s motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as
there appeared to be no genuine issue of fact.

The Court

further concluded that (1) there is no factual issue with
respect to whether or not the contract involved is a lease or
a security agreement or a contract of guarantee; (2) that
Respondant

properly pursued its remedies, and; (3) there was

no evidence to support Appellants1 allegation that Respondant
failed to mitigate its damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On September 30, 1981 Bradshaw-Ferrin Development

Company(neta party to the appeal) and Appellant entered into
an equipment lease agreement as lessees and MFT leasing as
lessor (Lease, R.3-6, A.4-7). These documents were admitted
as being true and exact copies of the original documents by
appellant in Appellants Answer to Respondants complaint as well
as numerous other places in the pleadings. (Answer R. 11-18).
2.

Mr. James Okland, the Secretary-treasurer of the

Appellant admits that he signed on behalf of the appellant
the equipment lease agreement and Corporate Resolution saying
he had the authority to sign on behalf of the Appellant
(Affidavit of James Okland, R.47-52, Memorandum in support of
plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment, R.154-163)
3.

On October 1, 1981 MFT Leasing issued and delivered

to Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company and Okland LTD.,Inc.
Check No. 16535 in the amount of $25,838.52 for the purchase
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of the equipment listed on the schedules to the equipment
lease agreement.

This check was endorsed by both defendants

(R. 240).
4.

On September 30, 1981 MFT Leasing prepared and gave

to Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company and Appellant a Bill
of Sale for the equipment which was later leased back to
Appellant and Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Co.(R. 241).
5.

Under the terms of the equipment lease agreement the

lessees agreed to a lease term on the equipment for sixty(60)
months, with payments of $775.19 per month, commencing
September 30, 1981(Complaint,R. 2-6; Lease R.3-6, A.4-7).
Appellant paid the 1*amount of $1,550.38 at the execution of the
lease which amount reflects payment of the first and last months
rental.
6.

Respondant became the successor in interest of MFT

leasing under the aformentioned agreements and thus became
entitled to all the benefits and obligations Appellant owed
to MFT Leasing.

This fact has never been questioned by the

Appellant except in it's brief.

Previously Appellant stated

it had no information as to this fact ( Complaint R.2-6; Answer
R. 11-18; Affidavit in support of plaintiff's motion for Summary
Judgment,R. 34-35; Amended Answer, R* 189-196; Affidavit in
support of plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment,R. 232-241).
7.

Appellant was given notice that the equipment lease

agreement was in default in April 1984. Appellant did nothing
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to resolve or cure this default (Affidavit in Support of plaintiff's
motion for Summary Judgment,R. 232-241)
8.

On May 16, 1984 Respondent filed a civil suit in the

Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, Civil No. C84-2941 alleging the default of the Appellant
and Bradshaw-Ferrin under the aformentioned equipment lease
agreements and asking for the sums past due and owing and the
return of the leased equipment (Complaint R. 2-6).
9.

Appellant answered Respondents complaint on June 20, 1984.

Appellant was allowed to amened its answer over the objections
of Respondant on September 9, 1985. In Appellants1 Amended answer
Okland affirmatively asseted as defenses that Respondantfs
Complaint (1) failed to state of claim against Okland;(2) that
Okland acted in good faith; (3) that Respondant failed to
midigate its damages; (4) that Respondant1 s claims should be
barred by failure of consideration, and; (5) that Respondantsf
claims are barred by the fact that the agreement between the
parties involves a security interest governed by Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. This last defense was allowed
over the objection of the Respondant.(Objection,R. 200-201).
10.

Appellant has alleged that approximately 60 days after

execution of the aforementioned agreements it withdrew from
negotitations which concerned the leased equipment and failed
to apply to MFT Leasing or Respondant for written permission
to be removed as lessee (Appellants Brief, page 6, Amended
-5-

Answer, R. 189-196).
11.

On April 4, 1985 Respondant filed its motion for

Summary Judgment against the Appellant and Bradshaw-Ferrin
Development Company.(Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 40-41).
12.

Before the hearing on Respondantfs motion for

Summary Judgment discussions were held whereby Appellant and
Respondant agreed to continue Respondant!s Motion for Summary
Judgment as it applied to Appellant without date.

Summary

Judgment was taken against Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company
due to the non-appearance of anyone on behalf of BradshawFerrin Development and there being no affidavits in oppostion
from Bradshaw-Ferrin Development Company. (Summary Judgment,R.123125).
13.

Counsel for the Respondant did have discussions with

counsel for Appellant and indicated that this looks like it
may be sale-lease back agreement but that it made no difference.
At no time has counsel for Respondant stated that the agreement
was not a "true lease".
14.

Discovery continued by Appellant after Respondants

motion for Summary Judgment was continued. Respondant fully
and completely complied with all discovery requests and at no
time did appellant object to Respondant*s answers or file any
motion to compel against Respondant.
15.

On August 28, 1985 Respondant renoticed itfs motion

for Summary Judgment which was heard on September 23, 1985 (Notice,

-6-

R. 150-151).

Respondant in further support of it's motion for

Summary Judgment filed the affidavit of Mr. Russell, Memorandum is support of motion for Summary Judgment, affidavit from
counsel for Respondant, Reply memorandum to Oklands memorandum
in opposition to motion for Summary Judgment and incorporating
the previous affidavit of Mr. C.S.Cummings. (R. 232-241,154-163,
260-261, 225-231, 34-35).
16.

Appellant filed it's memorandum in opposition to

Summary Judgment, the affidavit of James Okland, the affidavit
of counsel for appellant, and a second memorandum in oppostion
to motion for Summary Judgment (R. 57-77, 79-105, 47-52, 106-111,
70-77, 209-223).
17.

Respondant has never been able to locate or repossess

the equipment listed on the schedules to the equipment

lease

agreement. (Affidavit of C.S.Cummings, R.34-35; Memorandum is
support of Respondants Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 154-163;
Affidavit of D.R.Russell,R.232-241).
18.

The equipment listed on the schedules to the equipment

lease agreement has never been returned by Appellant or BradshawFerrin Development Company.
19.

On October 15, 1985 the Third Judicial District Court

in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Judith M. Billings
granted respondantfs motion for Summary Judgment. In the Summary
Judgment it should be noted that respondant did not ask for the
residual value of the equipment but the return of the equipment.
(Summary Judgment, R. 257-259).
-7-

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
SCOPE OF REVIEW
Appellant in its pleadings filed in this Court has raised
new and additional allegations and defenses.

These additional

allegations and defenses have never been raised, discussed
or objected to by the appellant in the lower court.
not part of the record on appeal.

These are

This fact give rise to the

issue of just exactly what can be reviewed on appeal.
This honorable Court has had this issue before it on
numerous occassions and the law is clear that matters not
presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first
time on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development
Company, Utah, 659 P,2d 1040, (1983); Simpson v. General Motors
Corporation, 470 P.2d 399, 24 Utah2d 301, (1970).
As stated in Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, infra,
by this court:
11

. . . Orderly procedure, whose proper
purpose is the final settlement of
controversies, requires that a party
must present his entire case and his
theory or theories of recovery to the
trial court; and having done so, he
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and thus attempt to keep -,
in motion a merry-go-round of litigation,
at 401."
It is the burden of the objecting party (here the appellant)
to make certain that the record on appeal adequately preserves
his arguments and objections.

Barson v. E.R.Squibb & Sons, Inc.,

Utah, 682 P.2d 832, 837-839, (1984); First Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, Utah, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266, (1984);
Skyline Leasing v. Datacap, Utah, 545 P.2d 512, (1976).
Appellant has raised for the first time on appeal the
following allegations, contentions and objections; (1) the
possible release from liability of other parties to the
transactions by MFT Leasing or Respondant, (2) that respondant
may not be the successor in interest to the MFT Leasing lease,
(3) the possibility of a prior sale of the leased equipment with
no credit given to the Appellant, (4) a question about insurance
and any insurance proceeds, (5) that Respondant was in a better
position to know of the location of the equipment than the
parties given possession of the equipment, (6) the sufficiency
of the affidavits filed by the Respondant in support of its
motion for summary judgment in the trial court, (7) the
sufficiency of Respondants answers to Appellants discovery
requests, and last but not least, (8) the possibility that the
lease should be declared void as a "penalty11.
These unsupported allegations, contentions, theories and
objections, together with all the rest in Appellants brief
and pleadings should not be considered by this Court.

POINT II
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED
IN THE TRIAL COURT TO THE
RESPONDANT AND AGAINST T^E
APPELLANT WAS PROPER AND
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD

Thoughout the proceedings in the trial court and again
stated in Appellants brief, Okland admitts liability under the
MFT Leasing lease, (emphasis added, Appellants brief pages 5,15 &
37).
Appellant further admits that (1) Okland executed the
MFT Leasing lease, (2) MFT Leasing, nor respondant, released
Okland from any liability, (3) that Okland has no information
as to what had or had not been paid on the lease or what was
due and owing under the lease, and, (4) that Okland has no
information as to the present whereabouts of the lease equipment,
(emphasis added, Appellants brief, page 15).
The only issue that remains is whether or not there was
sufficent uncontroverted evidence as to damages before the
trial court to support the granting of summary judgment.
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (A. 8)
speaking on summary judgments states:
fl

. . . The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories
and admissions on file (emphasis added),
together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.11
It should be noted at this point that when reviewing the
record in this matter that none of the depositions, answers
to interrogatories and admissions were ever published by the
parties and made part of the file.

Respondant does state that

even if they were part of the file it would not have changed

the trial court ruling.
The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to
look beyond the mere allegations in the pleadings to see
if there exists any genuine issue as to a material fact. If
there appears to be none the trial court should then award
judgment to the moving party when adequate proof is submitted
in support of the motion.

Pleadings alone are not sufficent

to raise an issue of fact. Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 10
Utah2d 251, (1960)
The opposing party should at a minimun produce some
evidence to contradict the movantfs case and raise a question
of fact.

The affidavits file by the Appellant in opposition

to Respondants motion for summary judgment state that
Okland does not have any information as to what is due and
owing under the lease.

This does not seem sufficient by its

self to raise a question of fact.
Summary judgment is not a harsh rule. When it appears
from the pleadings on file, the affidavits filed in support
of the motion for summary judgment and after hearing counsel
for both side present arguments both in favor and against
the summary judgment and there appears to be no genuine issue
of fact,summary judgment is the only proper procedure the
courts should use.Burningham v. Ott, Utah, 525 P.2d 620, (1974).
Appellant has had ample time to do discovery and to present
his evidence in opposition to respondants
judgment.
-11-

motion for summary

Rental payment balance:
Respondant has consistently thoughout the proceedings in
the trial court asserted that there were 31 rental payments
unpaid.

This fact has never been controverted by the Appellant

by any pleadings in the record.

Appellant does state that it

believes that Respondants calulations are incorrect but presented
no evidence to support this allegation.
Simple calulations based on the monthly rental payment
of $775.19 shows that $24,030.89 is still due and owing under
the terms of the lease agreement.
Appellant in its brief states that what was due and owing
under the lease(pursuant to the discount sheet) for the full
term was only $44,296.80. This figure is arrived at if one
takes the total monthly rental payment and subtracts the monthly
use taxes and then times that amount by sixty(60). ((775.19-36.91)x
60=$44,296.80).

Respondants figures are based upon the total

monthly rental payment of $775.19. This would make the total
owing under the full term of the lease $46,511.40.
Appellants arguments of what is really due and owing is
based purely on supposition and guess work.

In the affidavit

filed by Mr. James Okland on behalf of Appellant in opposition
to Respondants motion for summary judgment he states that the
only information he has as to what is due and owing could only
be supplied by an accounting by Respondant (R. 47-52,106-111).
Appellant assets that they never received any accounting. In
-12-

Appellants brief page 16 there are quoted some of the unpublished
answers supplied by Respondant to Oklands interrogatories.

The

only question that came close to asking for an accounting would
have been question 12 in which Respondant gave appellant a
break down of what it claimed was due and owing under the lease.
There were no objections to these answers ever raised by the
Appellant until this appeal. Appellant never raised the issue
that the use taxes should not be considered a part of the total
monthly rental payment.
Appellant tries to mislead this court by asserting that
there is only ,f20-some Thousand Dollars11 owing at the time of
the default of the lease and that the summary judgment in the
amount of unearly $34,000.00" is unfair.

Never once does he

mention that the amount due and owing under the lease is $24,030.89
principal only and that the $33,893.23 summary judgment includes
the principal, interest, late charges, property taxes, costs of
court and attorneys fees.

Appellant further tries to make the

claim that Respondants actual damages are only M$l ,800.00". No
where does Appellant want to give to the Respondant the benifit
of his bargin or any of the other sums it is obligated for
pursuant to the contract which Okland. admits liability under. If t\
was the law no one would ever lease anything or even make loans
over time as it would not be profitably.
It should also be noted that pursuant to the lease agreement,
paragraph 23,it states that the ownership of the lease equipment
is in the Respondant.

If Appellant wanted to purchase the leased

equipment it could have approached the Respondant and made an
offer.

Appellant claims as least it should have been given

ownership of the equipment in the summary judgment.

It should

again be noted that there is no mention of the residual value
of the equipment in the summary judgment.

If ownership was to

passj then Respondant should be entitled to the fair market
value of its property together with the other amounts past
due and owing.
Late charges:
Pursuant to paragraph 21 of the lease agreement, when the
lease became in default respondant was given the right to
accelerate the entire amount still left due and owing.
date of the default the amount of $24,030.89.

On the

Next under

paragraph 20 of the lease Respondant would be entited to collect
a five(5) percent late charge on the amounts past due and owing.
A simple calulation gives the late charges as being $1,201.54.
(.05 x $24,030.89).
Interest:
Again pursuant to paragraph 20 of the lease Respondant is
entitled to collect interest on the delinquent amount from the
due date thereof until paid at the rate of eighteen (18) percent
per annum.

This is a contract right agreed to by the Appellant

an which he has admitted liability.
The lease agreement was formally declared in default on
April 3, 1984.(Letter R. 110) Pursuant to paragraph 21 of the
lease agreement Appellant had ten (10) days to cure the default

or Respondant was entitled to proceed under the deafult provisions
of the lease.

Interest should have been taken from April 14, 1984

until October 15, 1985 (date of summary judgment) or 549 days.
Simple calulations again show that interest should have been
in the amount of $6,506.10. This is different from the amount
stated in the summary judgment only because there are more days
to consider.

The amount listed in the summary judgment using

similar calulations is correct if the days are from May 1, 1984
to the date of the filing of Respondants motion for summary
judgment.
Section 15-1-1(2) of the Utah Code annotated(A.9) provides
" The paries to a lawful contract may agree
upon any rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance
of any money, goods, or chose
in action.11
The parties to this contract agreed upon the interest provisions.
Prejudgment interest may be awarded in any case where the
loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount of the loss
can be calulated with a mathematical certainty. Jorgensen v.
John Clay and Co., Utah, 660 P2d 229,233 (1983).

The loss in

this matter is very certain and the calulations based on the
cmtract agreement is easily done with a mathematical certainty.
Respondant also questions whether this is prejudgment
interest11 or just contractual interest which just accurred prior
to judgment.
Appellant asserts that respondant should not be entitled to
any interest because of the delay by Respondant. Respondant

asserts that the delay in payment on the amount owing to it was
solely the delay of the Appellant. No money has ever been paid
or even offered since the default of the lease agreement. There
also is no

record of any efforts by Appellant to mitigate the

damages.
Use or Sales taxes:
This is another issue that was never discussed or raised
in the trial court and made an issue only on appeal.
Respondant has never asked or not has it ever been awarded
any damages based upon any sales taxes. The Use taxes were discusse
infra under monthly rental payments. Appellants argument is
that the property in order to be taxed must be "stored, used or
otherwise consummed in this state(Utah)f! before any such tax
can be collected.

On the date of the default the entire lease

was in default and all the amounts were accerated.

It was

Respondants belief that the equipment was still in Utah based
upon the wording of the lease which provides that the equipment
would be located at 699 East South Temple, Suite 310, Salt
Lake City, Utah and that before it could be moved the lessee
had to get the written permission of the lessor.(Lease, R. 3-6,A.
4-7, paragraph 11 and 7th line on first page).
The court did not rule that the equipment had "disappeared"
or was lost until October 15, 1985 or 559 days after the lease
was declared in default.
Respondant was awarded property

taxes for 1984 & 1985 based

upon paragraph 16 of the lease agreement.

These were also

assessed and paid prior to the trial courts ruling that the
equipment was lost or had "disappeared*1 *
Appellant has raised a lot of question on this appeal that
were not raised in the lower court. The evidence presented by
Respondant and reviewed here is clearly sufficent for the court
to grant summary judgment in favor of Respondant and against
Appellant when there nothing contravening Respondants evidence.
As stated by the honorable Judge Billings in ruling on Respondants
motion for summary judgment:
n

Mr. Coombs: Your Honor, what about the question
of damages? Should there be a trial on the
issue of damages?
Judge Billings: No. I think the Affidavit is
sufficient evidence of damages and there are
no contravening Affidavits to indicate those
damages are not correct.tf (T.4)

Mitigation of Damages:
One of Appellants affirmative defenses to Respondants
complaint was that respondant failed to mitigate its damages.
The trial court ruled that "as to the plaintiff's (Respondant)
failure to mitigate damages (this) court has found no evidence
of that before the court."(T.3). Appellant never did present
any admissable evidence on which the court could had decided
in its favor.
In a breach of contract action the aggrieved party is
entitled to those damages that will put it in as good a position
as it would have been had the defaulting party performed fully
under the terms of the agreement. Utah Farm Production Credit

Ass'n v Cox, Utah, 627 P.2d 62,64 (1981).
It is also the rule that the aggrieved party has a duty to
mitigate its damages. Utah Farm Production Credit Assfn v Cox,
infra; Thompson v. Jacobsen, 463 P.2d 301, 23 Utah2d 359, (1970);
Angelos v First Interstate Bank of Utah, Utah, 671 P.2d 772, (1983)
It is also generally stated that under the doctrine of
mitigation of damages that no one need take steps to avoid damages
because of a possible future threatened wrong but only take steps
to avoid or reduce the loss after the wrong has already been
committed. Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, infra, at 777.
Within three days after the default occured under the lease
notice was sent to the Appellant notifying it of the default.(R.110
Again 24 days later a second notice was mailed by certified mail
to the Appellant and telling it of the default. (R.lll).

Ninteen

(19) days after the second notice was mailed Respondant file suit
asking for

judgment of the sums not paid together with the

expenses of repossession and sale of the equipment.(R.2-6).
Appellant failed to do anything except answer the complaint dening
everything.

Appellant,by being

the

lessee, was to have the

control and possession of the leased equipment.

It was clearly

the party with better access to the equipment than the Respondant.
It appears from the record and due to the fact thau the equipment
has never been repossessed and that no one knows of its wereabouts
that respondant has done its best to mitigate its damages. There
is no evidence in the record presented by the Appellant that
respondant did not do everthing it could do to mitigate its
-18-

damages.
Appellant assets in its brief that Respondant "should have
brought suit earlier for adequate assurances of performance../1
(Appellants brief page 25). This is clearly not the law and if
it were it would be very burdensome whete, as in this matter
Respondant was given the complete portfolio of MFT Leasing.

If

suit was required to be brought against every lessee for adequate
assurance of performance it would becomb very expensive and time
consuming as well as a waste of courts time.
Appellant again raised an issue for the first time on
appeal with regards to insurance.

I would just direct this

court to paragraph 15 of the lease agreement whereby the lessees
are required to get and maintain insurance.

There has been no

issue until this appeal about whether not not there was insurance
and who got the proceeds. A claim could not have been made at
n^a case until the court ruled that the equipment was lost or
had disappeared and only then if the policy provided for this
coverage.

Lessee would have the policies, not the Respondant.

Respondant acted very reasonably under the facts of this
case.

If it were required to locate and sale the equipment

before filing suit in this matter there would be a very good
possibility that any statute of limitations would run and
respondant would recover nothing.
Lease v. Security agreement:
Another of Appellants affirmative defenses that requires
some attention is the one where Appellant wants to claim that
-19-

the lease agreement is not the entire agreement of the parties
and that Appellant should be allowed to present parol evidence
to show that the agreement is really a security agreement and
subject to the applicable Uniform Commercial Code provisions.
Appellant claims that the trial court "quite casually excludec
any evidence of any oral understanding to purchase the leased
equipment or any understandings with respect to whether the
Lease was an installment sale, a lease, one intended for security,
or a contract of guarantee, or even what its purpose was aside
from its label." (Apellant brief page 26)
Judge Billings quite properly stated in her ruling:
f!

The court is not persuaded that there
is sufficient evidence to indicate that
the contract at issue is not an integrated
contract and the court, therefore, grants
summary judgment on that contract and feels
it makes no difference whether it is a
contract of guarantee, contract of lease
or contract of security agreement, that
the remedy sought, which is payment of
the amount promised, is the appropriate
remedy since there has been no repossession
of equipment11because the equipment has
disappeared. (T. 3) .
The trial court never excluded any evidence that was properly
before it in making it ruling.

Based on the evidence it had

before it, the court ruled that the remedy sought was proper
no matter what the contract was labeled.

It was the burdern

of the Appellant to present evidence and explain to the court
why it made a difference if the contract was one of guarantee,
one for lease, or a contract of a security agreement.

This

has never been done and still in Appellants brief it has not

explained,

Respondant believes and concurrs with the trial

court that based upon the facts of this case it makes no difference.
Lets assume for a monement that the contract is not a lease
but a secured sale and subject to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.

This fact is strongly denied by the

Respondant.
Section 70A-9-501 of teh Utah Code Annotated (A.10) is
the applicable provision of the Uniform Commercial Code which
covers the facts of this case.

It states:

"DEFAULT PROCEDURE WHEN SECURITY AGREEMENT
COVERS BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.
(1) When a debtor is in default under a
security agreement, a secured party has
the rights "and remedies provided in this
[chapter] and except as limited by subsection (3) [Dispossion of collateral
after repossession] those provided in
the security agreement. He may reduce
his claim to judgment, foreclose or
otherwise enforce the security interest
by any availiable judicial procedure. ...ff
(emphasis added)
The remaining sections in part 5 of 70A-9-501 et.al., Utah Code
Annotated refers to the rights, duties and remedies of the parties
in the event of repossession.

This is not the case before

the court. Respondant stated in the affidavits filed in support
of its motion for summary judgment that it never repossessed the
equipment and the court ruled based on this, the record before it
and statements of counsel that the equipement was lost.
Appellant relies upon the case of FMA Financial Corp. v.
Pro Printers, Utah, 590 P.2d 803, (1979) for the proposition that
parol evidence should be allowed to explain the true nature of
the agreement between the parties.

Once this is done

Appellant believes that the agreement
guarantee or a security agreement.

could be a contract for

If it is a security agreement

then respondant was required to follow the procedures outlined
in the Uniform Commercial Code in the event of default.
The facts of the FMA case infra, are compleletly different
from the case before the court.

In that: case the court dealt with

the question of whether or not one party was entitled to
obtain a deficency judgment after that party had repossessed
and sold the equipment listed in the agreement.

This Court

held that parol evidence would be allowed as evidence in order
for the court to interpet the true meaning of the agreement betweei
the parties and that the agreement, even though termed a lease,
was in fact a security agreement.

Since it was a security

agreement the facts show that the repossessing party did not
comply with the provisions of Article 9, part 5 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.(78-9-501 et.al.).
Similar facts are discussed in the case quoted by Appellant
Haggis Management, Inc., v Turtle Management, Inc., 19 Ut Adv. Rpt
42 (Oct. 3,1985).
Respondant is not asking for a deficiency judgment from
the Appellant after dispossion of collateral as no collateral
has ever been recovered, returned or sold.

Respondant is seeking

to enforce a written contract. Appellant has never placed into
any evidence any facts or theories that would change Respondants
recovery even if this agreement was one intended for security.

Respondant has fully complied with the agreements between the
parties and any requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Sufficiency of Affidavits:
This again is another one of the numerous issues never
discussed, alleged or raised at the trial court level. This
is a new issue on appeal.
Appellant claims that the affidavits of Respondant in
support of its motion for summary judgment are based wholly
on conclusions of law.

A review of the affidavits will show

that this is not the case but only a statement of what facts
are in the possession of the Respondant.
Appellant further claims the affidavits must set forth
facts that are admissable in evidence.

Clearly the facts

stated by the Respondant are admissable in evidence but
further there were no objections to any statements in the
affidavits at the trial court level.
As stated by this court in Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Development Company, Utah, 659 P.2d 1040, 1044, (1983)
to similar arguments as the ones presented by the Appellant
here:
"Furthermore, if, on a motion for summary
judgment, an opposing party fails to move
to strike defective affidavits, he is
deemed to have waived his opposition to
whatever evidentiary defects may exist."
(emphasis added)
Lease should be void as a penalty:
Point 2 of Appellants brief raises the issue that this,

the MFT Leasing lease, could not support the summary judgment
or if it can then it should be declared void as a penalty.
This contention:, is another one which was raised for the first
time on appeal.

There is no evidence, allegations or

statements in the record from the trial court to establish
this question as a proper one for review.
In the event this court considers Appellants argument
Respondant states it is totally without merit.

In the first

part of Appellants argument (Appellant's brief page 29) it
states that paragraph 14 of the lease provides certain remedies
to the Lessor in the event of loss or damage to the leased equipmeni
Appellant states most of the paragraph in itfs brief but
conveniently leaves out the first sentence which states that
thefllessee shall bear the entire risk of loss, theft, destruction,
or damages to the leased equipment.11

Further in paragraph 15

of the lease it is the responsibility of the Appellant(lessee)
to provide maintain and pay all premiums for insurance for loss,
theft, destruction or damage to the leased equipment. The
court ruled that the equipment was lost or had disappeared.
This was on October 15, 1985, nearly 18 months after the lawsuit
began and the default occurred.

At the time of default by App-

ellant , Respondant chose and was required to proceed under
Paragraph 21 of the lease agreement providing obligations and
remedies in the event of default.
Paragraph 21 of the lease provides remedies available to

-24-

Respondant as the lessor when default occurs. Please note
that these are accumulative.

These are not related paragraphs

but independant provisions of a contract.
need to take place before either one
Respondant is not seeking any
stated by the Appellant.

Different events

comes into effect.

l!

double recovery11 as

Appellant is completely ignoring

the facts of this case which are clearly set forth in the
record.

Respondant is only seeking the damages it suffered

as a result of the breach of the lease

of which Appellant

is one of the lessees. No equipment has ever been recovered
or sold and no insurance proceeds have ever been asked for
by the Respondant.
Appellant refers to a discount sheet in this argument
which at no time has ever been made part of the record in
the lower court. His figures stated in this argument are
discussed infra in Respondants brief (Pages 12-14). The
damages asked for by the Respondant are

easily ascertainable

by simple calulations.
The damages awarded to the respondant at no time were
refered to as a penalty.

These are the actual damages suffered

by the Respondant and entitled to pursuant to the contract.
The cases sited by the Appellant are irrelevant with respect
to the law on penalty clauses. There is no penalty clause.
Further this is not

liguidated damages

any provision in the contract.

-25-

pursuant to

Appellant again sites numerous

in support of the theory that the MFT Leasing lease should
be void as an unconscionable

liquidated damage

provision.

It is generally the law that contract provisions providing
for liquidated damages in the event of default are prima ficie
valid, but the amount asked for cannot shock the conscience of
the court.

Appellant seems to be asking that the whole lease

be interpeted as a liquidated damage provision.
this be?

How can

It is a contract between two contractin parties

with consideration exchanged and Appellant admits liability
thereunder. Perkins v Spencer, Utah, 243 P.2d 446, (1952).
Appellant cites Ricker v Rombough, 261 P.2d 328, 120 Ca2d
Supp. 912 (1953) for the proposition that a rent acceleration
clause in a lease is unenforceable and void.
concerned

was

with the nonpayment of rent on an apartment, not

on personal property.
eleration

This case

Further, the court stated that rent acc-

clauses are generally enforceable.

It goes on to

state quoting from California case law.
11

Where the lease has not expired and
a forfeiture and restitution is sought
the measure for damages for a breach
of the covenant to pay the rent fixed
by the lease is the amount of rent
unpaid and no more. Quoting Knight v.
Marks, 183 Cal 354, 357, 191 P.531,
532, at 330"
Respondant is only asking for the unpaid rent, interest thereon,
late charges pursuant to the contract, property taxes and
attorneys fees pursuant to the contract.
or liquidated damages provisions.
-26-

There is no penatly

Appellant further states that the summary judgment
The lease if it ran itfs

awards amounts for future loss.

term would have expired Septeber 30, 1986, the interest is
calulated on the days already past, the property taxes are
paid and the attorneys

fees incurred.
CONCLUSION

Respondant respectfully asked the court to affirm the
trial court summary judgment for the full amount and allow
Respondant its interest that has accurred since the judgment,
costs of this appeal and attorneys fees.
The summary judgment entered in the trial court is fully
supported by the pleadings it had before it and to reverse and
remand this matter for further consideration would be a waste
of the courts time as well as that of counsel for both parties.
The truism that " justice delayed is justice denied11 is
clearly at work in this matter when the record is reviewed
as a whole in this matter.
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of August, 1986.
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Kyle W Jones
Attorney/ for Respondant
Fiifst Security Financial
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four copies of Respondant brief have
been delivered to John Michael Coombs, Attorney for Appellant,
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72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; L.R.
Gardiner, Attorney for Robert M. Simonsen and Simpar Associates,
57 West 200 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110; and
four copies have been mailed to Doug Bradshaw, Bradshaw development
Company c/o Douglas C. Bradshaw, 4164 Cresta Avenue, Santa Barbara
California, 93102, this 6ch day of August, 1986.
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y<h. / >V^Kyle W Jones
Attorney for Respondant
First Security Financial

ADDENDUM

Kyle W. Jones - 1744
Attorney for Plaintiff
200 South Main, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 359-7771
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
vs.
OKLAND LTD., INC. and
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, now known as
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
OKLAND LTD., INC. ,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C-84-2941
vs.
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN,
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP,
a limited partnership and
JOHN DOES 1 - 5 ,

Assigned:

Judge Billir

Third-Party
Defendants.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant
Okland Ltd., Inc., came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
A.l

Judith Billings, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday,
September 23, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. Plaintiff appeared
by and through its attorney of record, Kyle W. Jones, and
defendant Okland Ltd., Inc. appeared by and through its attorney
of record, John Michael Coombs. No other parties appeared on
behalf of any of the other parties in this matter. The court,
after hearing the arguments in this matter, having reviewed the
pleadings on file herein, finds that there is no factual issue
with respect to whether or not the contract involved is a lease
or a security agreement or a contract of guarantee and that
plaintiff has properly pursued its remedies and that there is no
evidence to support defendant's allegation that the plaintiff
failed to mitigate its damages thereby the court enters this
Judgment as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Okland
Ltd., Inc., be granted and that plaintiff be awarded Judgment in
the following amounts:
$24,030.89 amount remaining to be paid under contract;
363.52 property taxes for 1984;
341.80 property taxes for 1985;
1,201.25 late charges pursuant to contract;
6,055.77 interest;
1,900.00 attorney's fees
$33,893.23 Total Judgment
with interest on the total Judgment at eighteen percent (18%) per
annum as provided by the contract from the date of this Judgment
until paid, plus after accruing costs, attorney's fees and the
expenses of location, repossession and sale of the leased equipment
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiff be granted all necessary writs and orders necessary to
recover its leased equipment if and when it is located.
DATED this /^
day of September, 1985.
BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a true and
exact copy of the foregoing Summary Judgment this Jll/
day of
September, 1985, postage prepaid, by U.S. mail, to:
John Michael Coombs
72 East 400 South, Suite 325
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Steven D. Crawley
2225 East 4800 South, Suite 107
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
L. R. Gardiner, Jr.
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
P. 0. Box 3450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

MFT L E A S I N G
135 South Main Sireet
ASSIGNED TO MFT LEASING
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK
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Monthly Rental Payment: * , 7 ^ R . ? ft
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\.
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"""pre

Months

•16-,-M-
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(Other)
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'

Monthly

Rental Payment:
IA laamon, advance payments equal to the fust and

U\i,
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THIS LEASE ALSO INCLUDES ALL TERMS AND PROVISIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF.
THIS LEASE CANNOT BE CANCELLED BY LESSEE.
LESSOR

XHXBIT A
MFT
Bv.

•LESSEf; (Aulhorlxed Signature & Title)

JDvC

LEASlh

-tn*~

M F T LEASING
EXHIBIT A

NAME OF LESSEE
Okland LTD. Inc. and
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company
699 East South Temple Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102

SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT

QUANTITY

EQUIPMENT. (MANUFACTURER, MAKE," MODEL i,

SERIAL NO.

DESCRIPTION}

Floral Brass Arrangement
Exterior Rendering of Wilshire Condo.
10" Palms
8" Ferns
10M Baskets
10" Baskets
8" Trays
Sofa Orlanda Garden
Circular Hunt Desk
Green High Back Arm ChaiTS
Leather Arm Chair
Lamp Table Lattice
Lattice Couch Table
Oak Frame S Glass for Renderings
1 Oak Frame for Large City Scape Photo

2

Builder/Developer Panel

2

Frames

1

Availability Board 2-Color Sil Screened
Frame and Glass
Prints and Mounting

1

Sign for Hallway 20 x 20 2-Color 1 Side Installed

LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE.
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO

. ,.

A.5
BE SHOWN ABOVE.

DATE:
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LEASE NO.:
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BY: ^
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S t ^
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M F T LEASING
EXHIBIT A

r

SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT

QUANTITY '

ESSEE

Okland LTD. W . SK. JOkl
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company
699 East South Temple Suite 310
Salt Lake Ciy, Utah, 84102

EQUIPMENT. (MANUFACTURER, • M A K E / MODEL^ Sf DESCRIPTIONj

SERIAL NO.

1

Sign for Exterior - 30 x 30 2-Color'2 Sides
.Rug 6 x 9

1.

Flora Green

1

36 x 72 Oak Windsor Desk

1

No.

1

2395 Lamp Brass

'

• Peach Sofa

2

. No. 103 Camel Chairs, Armed .

1

811 SW Camel Chair Exec,

1

Windsor Left Oak Steno Desk

2" -.

720 Beige Chairs

%

':'

.1

1

750S Green Chair Exec 0

' 1 :ro LI

1

9/16" Ecco Bond Pad (33,33 yds)

1

Rug(Oriental in entry)

1
1

.'

'

1

.

• ' „

'.No.

•

!

*4

of

the

6

_ '_

'•

Wilshire

^
. .

'•'•.•

8273 Dear, in Forest Picture

Scale Model

••

*

NOc 8292 Landscape Picture

1

5

Installed

'

\

Condominium

•/. '
°

'. . -

' ;*

Interior Renderings of Wilshire

•
Silk Screened Floor Plans 2-Color

w/Backliphtin»

2

Floor Plan Display Tables

1

Large Table Housing 3 Floor Plans

1

Large Table for Scale Model Display

6

Ink Floor Plans 5 Photostats*
DATE?

LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE.
*AME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO
Xkv cunrjrM uprnrp
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LEASE NO.: 10-0031743-6
BY:

=^fe#^

£e<^.
TITLE

M F T LEASING
EXHIBIT A

r

SUPPLIER OF EQUIPMENT

NAME OF LESSEE

Okland LTD Inc. and
Bradshaw Ferrin Development Company]
699 East South Temple Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

EQUIPMENT. (MANUFACTURER,'MAKE/MODEL

SERIAL NO.

QUANTITY

_

•

2

'

- - • •

-

—

f, DESCRIPTIc
A

-

•

30 x 36 Sample Board Panels for Interior Design
30 x 52 Sample Board Panel for Interior Desing

1

•

*

•
•
t

,

.'

•

•

'

*
•

i/u&t

DATE:
LESSEE MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS PAGE.
NAME AND ADDRESS MUST ALSO
BE SHOWN ABOVE.

LEASE NO.;

BY: ^ - _

10-0031743-6

^Al&JL

SIGNATURE

A.7
BY

<>sz:CL.
TITL

Rule 56.

Summary Judgment

(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment
is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
COMMITTEE NOTE: Rule 56(c) was amended by the Supreme Court on
June 30, 1965, effective October 1, 1965. The amendment inserted "answers to interrogatories" in the third sentenct.

(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case
or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the
hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts ^re actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.

TITLE 15
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL
Chapter
L5-1. Interest.
15-2. Legal capacity of children.
15-6. Prompt Payment Act.
15-7. Registered Public Obligations Act.

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST
Section
15-1-1. Interest rates — Legal rate — Contracted rate.
15-1-4. Interest on judgments.

15-1-1. Interest rates — Legal rate — Contracted rate. (1} Except when parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or [tktnfs] chose in action
shall be 10% per annum. [Btrt nothingfceremcontained shaH] Nothing in this section may be [so] construed [«s] to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge
which by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations
made before [the 44th day of] May 14,1981.
(2) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, §3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; L.
1935, ch. 42, 81; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, ch.
73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1981 amendment increased the rate in
the first sentence from 6% to 10%; and
changed the date at the end of the last sentence from 1907 to 1981.

15-1-4. Interest on judgments. Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
shall conform thereto and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which
shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate
of 12% per annum.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, than eight percent for late payment of cash
§ 1241X9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. ordered paid in a property division in a
1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2.
divorce action where the property division
award is reasonable and equitable. Pope v.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1981 amendment increased the inter- Pope (1978) 589 P 2d 752.
est rate from 8% to 12%.
Prejudgment interest.
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate as
Late payment of property division in
divorce action.
to awards for mental anguish and punitive
This section does not prohibit a district damages. First Security Bank of Utah v.
court from imposing an interest rate of more J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc. (1982) 653 P 2d 591.
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DEFAULT
Section
M-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers both real and personal
property.
70A-9-5O2. Collection rights of secured party.
iOA-9-503. Secured party's right to take possession after default.
iDA-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of collateral after default — Effect of disposition.
TOA-9-505. Compulsory disposition of collateral — Acceptance of the collateral as discharge
of obligation.
70A-9-5O6. Debtor's right to redeem collateral.
7DA-9-507. Secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part.

70A-9-501. Default — Procedure when security agreement covers
both real and personal property.
(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured
party has the rights and remedies provided in this part and except
as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agreement. He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise
enforce the security interest by any available judicial procedure. If
the collateral is documents the secured party may proceed either
as to the documents or as to the goods covered thereby. A secured
party in possession has the rights, remedies and duties provided
in section 70A-9-207. The rights and remedies referred to in this
subsection are cumulative.
(2) After default, the debtor has the rights and remedies provided in
this part, those provided in the security agreement and those provided in section 70A-9-207.
(3)

(4)

(5)

To the extent that they give rights to the debtor and impose duties
on the secured party, the rules stated in the subsections referred
to below may not be waived or varied except as provided with
respect to compulsory disposition of collateral (subsection (3) of
section 70A-9-504 and section 70A-9-505) and with respect to
redemption of collateral (section 70A-9-506) but the parties may by
agreement determine the standards by which the fulfillment of
these rights and duties is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable:
(a)
subsection (2) of section 70A-9-502 and subsection (2) of
section 70A-9°504 in so far as they require accounting for
surplus proceeds of collateral;
(b)
subsection (3) of section 70A-9-504 and subsection (1) of
section 70A-9-505 which deal with disposition of collateral;
(c)
subsection (2) of section 70A-9-505 which deals with acceptance of collateral as discharge of obligation;
(d)
section 70A-9-506 which deals with redemption of collateral;
and
(e)
subsection (1) of section 70A-9-507 which deals with the
secured party's liability for failure to comply with this part.
If the security agreement covers both real and personal property,
the secured party may proceed under this part as to the personal
property or he may proceed as to both the real and the personal
property in accordance with his rights and remedies in respect of
the real property in which case the provisions of this part do not
apply.
When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the lien
of any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of
any execution based upon the judgment shall relate back to the
date of the perfection of the security interest in such collateral. A
judicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of the
security interest by judicial procedure within the meaning of this
section, and the secured party may purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this
chapter.
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